

# THE FLIMSY INSTITUTIONS OF SOUTH SUDAN: NATIONAL SECURITY PERILS AND ABSOLVED CONSTITUTIONAL MAKING DISPENSATION

*Ajang J. Atem, PhD*

*Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Juba, South Sudan*

## **Abstract:**

South Sudan has been described as a failed state which cannot provide services for its citizens and is still struggling on national security. The institutions that are supposed to protect national security and the citizens of South Sudan are weak, corrupt, ethnic divisions, they lack capacity, human resource is largely still absent, even the leaders at the different levels cannot be categorized as very appropriate. South Sudan could not be expected to build these institutions in the short period after independence from Sudan. The short period of time from the time of secession can also be a useful perspective to look at the history of southern Sudan in Sudan and how institutions in southern Sudan were neglected and gave no foundation to the people in southern Sudan to have a sense of institutions from their values, norms which were disrupted by the colonialists during the state formation process in Sudan. Even the constitutional making process to the final draft has been non-participatory. This all can be useful in explaining why South Sudan as a new state may be like the rest of the sub-Saharan Africa that were colonized and are facing national insecurity issues.

**Keywords:** *Institutions, National security, South Sudan, Ethnic divisions, Corruption.*

## **Introduction**

Institutions are generated from the accumulation of ethnic or traditional standards and customs that a particular group of people holds as important to their survival (Alesina, & Giuliano, 2015). While it is easy to argue that no group of people, in the contemporary world is protected from outside effect, any plagiarized standards and customs that are revealed in specific institutions turn into expressive and acceptable only if they have been reclaimed and operated on by key societies. Like the example of Iraq demonstrates, the existence of a big combined armed strength with a rigorous nation building agenda was not adequate to alter institutions in a preferred direction of democratic governance (Scholvin, 2011). That kind of maneuver may perhaps be realized with the learning of the intended values by some sections of Iraq population. This scenario is quite similar to what happened to the states in Africa which had their own values and norms that had been evolving for some time when the colonialists interrupted the process. The colonialists introduced a whole lot of

institutions from language, religion, even new leaders where they felt that those who were there were not going to serve them (Bayeh, 2015). It is important to observe that Africa had its type of governance culture in the period before the coming of the colonialists, which, during this contact with the outside world was destroyed by the effects of slavery, colonialism and the new wave of the latest form of colonialism (Farah et al., 2011). While debating the same Wyk, (2007) attractively observed that the modern African State is a leftover of a past colonial state with a system and institutions forced on the Africans. In the confusion that was created by the colonial interruption of the process of state formation the African leaders picked on a colonial-built system which led to tribal and cultural divisions and totalitarian grounded values (ibid). It is not by coincidence that the colonial powers were not attracted to building democratic institutions in Africa nor were they ready to train the new African leaders in what they deemed important for the type of Westphalian state they had in Europe. On the other hand, they used the Africans for their own interests and the post-independence era became a period of trying to forge national integration (Lancaster, 2012) which is very vital for national security. According to Copson (Copson, 2001) the colonial polity in Africa was characterized by totalitarianism and it was an inflexible device of domination and was never an institution of democracy as planned by the colonialists.

## **Literature Review**

Under the literature concerning institutions in Africa, a great deal of consideration has been dedicated to the part of times gone by and specifically colonial past. Africa characterizes suitable situation for examining the effects of colonial leadership since, historically, there is no place, where colonization had extensive happenings that started at the close of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as it was in Africa. There exists a common view that instability, which is related to national security issues, as well as other security related aspects like corruption and ethnic wars and struggles can notice its origins in the bequest of the colonial era (Ali, Fjeldstad, & Shifa, 2020). This history therefore emphasizes the fact that once the evolutionary state formation was interrupted it was going to be hard to have institutions which were going to serve and protect the state like South Sudan which was part of Sudan dominated by the Turks, the Egyptians as agents and the big colonial master, Britain (Gabriel, 1989).

According to Moore (2004), there are shared features of state formation not only in South Sudan but also the bigger part of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Yakubu, 2018); its unnatural features that grew out of colonization, the extractive character of the foreign forces in the form of colonial supremacy, the political and economic reliance from the resident authority from Britain and the structure of indirect leadership under the regime of imperial Britain (Austin, 2010). The interruption of state formation in Africa and in the areas occupied by South Sudan in particular is captured in the literature on colonial effect that has progressed alongside dualistic but distinct but approving constituents. One constituency emphasizes the identity of the colonial master and the other details at the setting or environment in the colonial territories. In the first thread Ali, Fjeldstad, Jiang, & Shifa (2019), have put emphasis on the legal structure bequeathed to the post-colonial, Bertocchi and Canova (2002) on the nationality of the colonialists, Hall and Jones (1999) on the degree to which the basic language of Europe is used as principal language currently. The question of whether the area colonized by Britain or France inherited a better institution does not make a lot of sense when it comes to how state formation in Africa was interrupted and how this affected the institutions that were bequeathed to the post-colonial state.

In the second thread, Acemoglu et al (2001) argues that there is a thinking that is surrounded by a substitute philosophy or hypothesis of institutional advancement which stresses the environment in the colonial states and specifically settler death. The second is used as a tool for the existing institutions as gauged by the danger of expropriation in an attempt to describe in what way institutions impacted the economic security of the colonial territories. The method is very much

linked to Engerman and Sokoloff (2000), who connect institutions to factor natural gifts or attributes. On the basis of this literature, for one to examine the historical contributing factors of national insecurity in many African states, one needs to take advantage of the information surrounding colonization by bringing in several colonial changing factors or attributes that indicate both the methods explained above; therefore, one can assess the effect of the national identity of the colonialists, the political position of the subjugated states and settler death (Farnetti, & Novelli, (Eds.) (2015). The outcome of the occurrence of the interruption of the state formation process was the construction of institutions (DiJohn, 2008). which did not help the indigenous people but those that dominated the people in those areas or polities (Lambach, Johais, & Bayer,2017). Some of the post-colonial leaders that came after the colonialists were trying to change the situation but because of the need to stay in power, under every circumstance like the colonists, they used some of the very methods used by the colonialists and eventually the institutions that they built were almost a replica of what they were given by the colonialists. Carneiro (1970) has argued that states emerge from situations that are linked to conquest and control. These were some of the premises on which he constructed his conquest theory that was developed to offer a more respected and well-defined opinion of state formation that was discussed as having arisen from various deliberations that shaped the foundation of the conquests. Some of the factors considered comprised of agriculture, warfare and irrigation, the argument by Carroll (2009) emphasizes the force theory that is grounded on states continuing out of military maneuvers (Ibid). It is this military that is regarded as the superseding feature before mutual understanding as discussed in the social contract theory can take place (Pemberton, 2014). This understanding is often between the military and the subjects who are the vanquished. It is further argued that the military factor will generate the connection with protection of the citizens and the collection of taxes from the citizens for the protection (ibid). While it can be said that the military was the dominant issue, it is very hard to neglect the factor of undermining the social economic issues which had far reaching effects on the state formation process in relation to institution building as in some places there was slavery which meant taking people from so many societies in Africa. Despite the fact that altogether this can be linked to state formation in Africa and Sudan in particular, many scholars have not linked colonial military conquest and control to the formation of the colonial State in Africa (Salihu, 2016). Big volumes of literature that is associated with state formation, has been grounded on the State in Europe (Charlotte, 2008). and very little has been associated with the State in Africa. The accurate characteristics of alien control and brutality as seen in Namibia, with the Germans the Ndebele in present day Zimbabwe, in Democratic Republic of Congo under the rule of the Belgians just to reveal a small number (Fischer-Tiné, & Gehrman, 2009). Furthermore, the getting hold of territory consequently demands the creation of governmental culpabilities and these comprise police or security of the territory and the inhabitants in the polity conquered by the conquerors. The existence of the essentials from the conqueror's part and the need from the side of the defeated in the polity creates an environment of shared acceptance between the two sides. What is not stated at this moment is the situation where the conqueror is not interested in the area but only interested in what the vanquished have as was the case with the colonialists in Sudan and in so many places in Africa.

If an individual does not assess this kind of situation, makes it hard for one to see how the foreign leaders influenced the creation of State institutions. Here, one can appreciate why the colonialists could not construct institutions that would fight them. In such circumstances, they put more importance on divide and rule which intensified or sharpened ethnic divisions that were there in the process of state formation before the coming of the colonialists (Tharoor, 2017). Unquestionably, the institutions that were passed on to the new leaders at independence were a reflection of the foundation that was built by the colonialists. Cheeseman & Fisher, (2019), while writing about how colonial rule bound Africa to fragile authoritarianism” showed the troubles of colonialism in the institutional set up of what was bequeathed to the leaders who came after them. One wonders really

if the situation in Sudan and South Sudan that broke away from Sudan could be different from a pattern which is hypothesized to be the same in areas where colonialism was practiced most especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The present nature and character of Institutions in South Sudan cannot be traced without analyzing the Anglo-Egyptian condominium which existed between 1898 to 1955 (Barltrop, 2015). This condominium which dominated Sudan under which Southern Sudan did not only practice bureaucratic layout which was meant to extract resources from Sudan but also operated a separate structure of administration between the north and South of Sudan (Kon, 2015). It is interesting that immediately after independence, Sudan fell into prolonged civil wars (Zapata, 2011). This can be explained in two ways, one, that what the condominium did was so ruthless that there was no space for any uprising under this exploitative rule of the British and the Egyptians. Secondly, one can say that the south was only waiting for an opportune moment to show how they had been exploited but could not garner enough military muscle to fight the condominium. This seems to suggest that the British had forced two regions into a polity which was so artificial and did not take the trouble to build institutions to deal with the challenges which were to explode because they knew their stay was temporary for economic benefits. It is important to note that the conflict that raged in Sudan (Elnur, 2009) when the people of the South were fighting for their recognition as citizens (El-Sadany, 2012) meant that the social fabric as the foundation of institutions in Sudan was shaky because the interruption of the evolutionary state foundation led to deeper divisions among the people of Sudan such that when the comprehensive Peace agreement was signed in 2005 (Aalen, 2013), not much was still together as the prolonged conflict had eroded what was left by the condominium and not much could be harnessed in the South of Sudan. The granting of the semi-autonomous government to Southern Sudan with a new interim constitution could (Medani, 2011) have laid the ground for the institutions that were to crop up and nurtured in the values, norms and traditions of Southern Sudanese but the history of the people had taken its toll on this process. This meant that the process of constructing institutions on the foundation of national identity which was missing in Sudan now stood on the fragile and persisting competing social and cultural disharmony, high illiteracy among the people of Southern Sudan and the absence of a stock of political leaders (Kon, 2015; Pape et al., 2018). who could read and understand the history of Sudan in relation to the new state that was declared in 2011.

South Sudan, like many other states in Africa particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, has national security issues and this has been reflected in the description it has continually received as a failed state, riddled with corruption (The sentry, 2019), ethnic tensions a divided army along ethnic lines and a constitution which has been argued as one which did not reflect the aspirations of the South Sudanese (Kuol, 2020). When one recalls how the British and Egyptians constructed the colonial state in Sudan, it is no wonder that the features of democracy were nowhere. This meant that participation in Sudan was not known (Deng, 2017), if it were to be there, how could the people of the north who enslaved the people of the South be involved in the process of writing a constitution. It is from such instances that the constitution which is the guiding law on institution has been a disappointment to the people of South Sudan. Many constitutions in African states are written in foreign language and not many people are worried about this problem (Namyalo, & Nakayiza, 2015; Chimhundu, 1997). This could be used to explain the crimes that are experienced in these states since the citizens cannot understand and access the copies in the languages they understand. It is not surprising that in such situations national security is compromised since the relationship between different groups of people is not understood, the obligations of citizens not comprehended, protection and services to be provided and by what institutions are also not understood. In the urge to comprehend the trials facing Africa and specifically South Sudan, while it tries to profit from continuous development and guaranteeing national security, there is necessity to put under consideration not only the institutions but effort should also be made in trying to understand what

these institutions do to the practice of power. Unofficial institutions have their foundation in society instead of the state and produce a specific vibrancy to politics that cannot easily be evident where official institutions are domineering (Hyden, 2010). It is because of this reason that any inquiry around African politics is inadequate if it is observed as neutral on economy and society. It is rational to create such a difference everywhere official rulebooks exist (Hyden, 2010). What happens in most cases is that when some authors from the west are carrying out studies, little attention is done on what actually happens in Africa or it is just ignored for unknown reasons. Many authors will write about the struggles through which South Sudan as a new state is going through political instability, a divided army, corruption, ethnic violence or societal threats, economic threats like unemployment among the youth, and the general failure to provide services to the citizens. One can even suggest that this could be from several factors including the state formation that was interrupted in Sudan where South Sudan was a part as southern Sudan. One would have expected that South Sudan was going to learn from the many African states which got independence before it did, but the few years of independence have indicated that South Sudan is following in the experiences of the rest of the sub-Saharan states, there are renewed threats against national security, multiplication of militias, ethnic tensions in Upper Nile and unity state, food insecurity and the continued displacement of people and the ever increasing number of refugees all over East Africa and the world. The ever-increasing list of security threats depicts that the institutions in South Sudan may not be working because of their nature and character. The weaknesses and incoherence of institutions in South Sudan may be as a result of the process of state formation. The existing insecurity in South Sudan whether traditional security or human security can effectively be understood with an examination of the nature and character of institutions in South Sudan. Therefore, this study is aimed at examining how the nature and character of institutions in South Sudan has led to the national security threats in the newly independent state of South Sudan.

## **Methods**

### **Research design**

The study used the descriptive cross-sectional survey design because it helps with the identification of the variable of state institutions and national security since the design looks at different categories of people at the same time. This design was used to describe characteristics of the relationships between nature and character of state institutions and national security. This design was applied because it looks at different groups of people who differ on the variable of opinions and interest but who share other characteristics such as socio-political status (Carl, 2003). This design was used because it helps the researcher collect both qualitative and quantitative data at the same time thereby saving time. The design also helped in identifying associations that could be studied with different categories of respondents. The study used mixed methods implying quantitative both with qualitative approach. Qualitative method sought in-depth understanding of complex historical nature and character of state institutions issues and were most useful for answering humanistic "why?" and "how?" questions. The quantitative approach was used to cater for numerical data which represented the magnitude of the problem that was being studied. This study employed both descriptive and interpretive traditions of Husserl and Heidegger to describe and interpret the occurrences that were sought by the researcher from the respondents about the independent variable (nature and character of state institutions) and dependent variable (national security) of South Sudan. The description of the population is an obligation in the inquiries or study papers of qualitative and quantitative research. Additionally, the ideas of overall, target and reachable population usually relate to both qualitative and quantitative designs. Nevertheless, the description of the population is not directed by similar philosophies in qualitative and quantitative inquiries or research (Creswell, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The study population therefore included institutions of government, which consisted; the institution of judiciary, the executive, the



legislature and importantly the social institutions of education which shapes the values of the state. Officials who were called upon for qualitative data characterize the population. The designated population were based on decisive factors which consisted of; the importance of the institution on national security and ease of accessibility. According to Asiamah, Mensah and Oteng-Abayie (2017), inside qualitative studies, the decision on the target population would consider the aspect of the issue that the investigator puts emphasis on, the respondents who may in most cases communicate their understanding and opinions, or views to tackle the qualitative inquiry overall objectives. To make a decision therefore on the target population, the investigator had to identify and get rid of some of the respondents, who did not understand, or who could not give opinions or views in a sufficient simplicity and penetration. The target study population included government or state institutions which were built ever since South Sudan became independent in 2011. These institutions were vital for national security and human security in South Sudan. 4 officials from the legislature, Ministry of internal affairs, these are responsible for streamlining the way the police execute their work before linking up with the judiciary, the army is at the core of the protection of the state of South Sudan and the social institutions like; religious institutions, cultural institutions, the ministry of education, ministry of culture and also the ministry of finance which is responsible for developing budgets for the institutions; 10 ministry of internal affairs, who guide what happens in the boundaries of the state; 4 officials of security institutions,; and 284 citizens of South Sudan who have been in South Sudan from the tie South Sudan broke away from Sudan. These institutions reflect the Sectorial Approach which means that the sectors that can be sources of security threats and these include; the military, economic, political, societal, and environment. The sample size representative of the categories of respondents in this study was 302. It was determined using the Krejcie and Morgan’s sample size calculation, which is the same as using the Krejcie and Morgan’s sample size determination Table. The sample size determination Table 3.1 is a derivative from the size calculation, which is expressed below. The Krejcie and Morgan sample size calculation is based on .50 in the Table at the appendix. The formula used for the calculation is;

$$n = \frac{X^2 * NP * (1-P)}{ME^2 * (N-1)} + (x^2 * P * (1-P))$$

n= Sample size

$X^2$  = Chi-square for the specified confidence level at 1 degree of freedom

N=Population size

P= Population proportion (.50 in this table)

ME=Desired margin of error (expressed as a proportion)

**Table 1: Sample size determination table**

Category	Population (N)	Sample size. (n)	Sampling technique
Citizens in South Sudan	1400	284	Random sampling
Ministry of internal affairs officials		4	Purposive sampling
Officials in social institutions		4	Purposive sampling
Officials from security institutions		10	Purposive sampling
<b>Total</b>	<b>1400</b>	<b>302</b>	

The study employed the following sampling techniques namely: Random sampling was used to choose the citizens of South Sudan using national identity cards to confirm the identity of the respondents as the sampling frame. The number of citizens selected randomly were two hundred eighty-four, those that were purposely selected were eighteen, and therefore the technique suited this big number of citizens to choose a sample, which is representative enough. This technique was

used to give an equal chance to the citizens in South Sudan that were chosen for the study. On the other hand, purposive sampling was used to select the of institutions who had the relevant information for the study. These techniques enabled the researcher to obtain a representative sample that helped to acquire a pool of data and in-depth understanding of the problem. The researcher also employed expert sampling to select those experts on the themes of study. These included experts on the history of South Sudan, the development of institutions in S. Sudan and the national security issues in S. Sudan. These were expected to give their objective opinions on the themes and depending on the rich knowledge that they have accumulated over time. The gathering of data performs an important part in research. For a study to be carried out, the researcher needs to use different sources of data and these sources can be categorized as primary or secondary data (Douglas, 2015). Since the term implies, primary data is one that is gathered for the very first time and on the other hand, secondary data refers to data that had already been gathered by other researchers or authors for other objectives, but related to the study of the current researcher (Ajayi, 2017). This study therefore employed both primary and secondary sources of data; primary data was gathered through the words between the researcher and the respondents, written responses and observable items and experiences, which may be in form of pictures. Primary data was gathered through focus groups discussions, interviews, and observations. The study employed the following quantitative and qualitative methods to gather data. The study used qualitative methods in the collection of data. This involved the use of interviews that were conducted with key informants from the selected institutions. Mack et al (2011) rationalized that interviews permit obtaining of a clear representation of the respondents' viewpoint on the study topic, which is about state formation and national security observed through the institutions that are responsible for national security. Interviews were used because the key informants are thought to have in-depth information about the variables of the study. Interviews were used to collect the needed data from people that have accumulated knowledge because of their experience and their work. The interviews were carried out with the use of an interview guide. This was used to gather information using face-to-face dialogue between the researcher and key informants on issues to do with state formation and national security. The researcher also used Focus Group discussions. To permit the respondents to have a fruitful discussion, where opinions and experiences on how the nature and character of state institutions affect national security, 5 FGDs of not more than 6-10 people were held with the citizens of South Sudan. According to Kumar (2011), FGDs have more particular and resolute concerns that were prearranged by the investigator.

### **Data Analysis**


Patton & Cochran, (2002) have discussed the normal techniques for descriptive qualitative inquiries under which the traditional topics that emerge during gathering of data are recognized. The researcher depended on the critical levels stipulated by Patton & Cochran, (2002), where the kind of data analysis considered themes analysis, where the investigator read and interpreted the texts. Sometimes the researcher considered opinions or through building observations to attain the sense of the data. There was the recognition of the themes and making short what the respondents were bringing up such that the investigator could get a hidden standpoint of the undertaking, which was being carried out. With quantitative data analysis, the researcher processed quantitative data using statistical procedures. The researcher turned figures from questionnaires into frequency counts and these were presented in graphs. On the ethical consideration, the standards of research ask the investigators to keep away from damaging the respondents that are involved in the course of gathering data and considering the needs and the welfare and concerns of those involved in the studies. (Flick, 2009). Bearing in mind all this, the researcher took responsibility to ensure that, the respondents are informed about the value of the study being investigated. This enabled the respondents to appreciate positively their contribution as participants in the study. The researcher ensured that, the informed consent of the respondents was sought first, in order to carry out any

other study activities such as: the use of photographic equipment where there was need and use of audio recorders where there was need. The researcher observed the research norms including honesty, confidentiality, accurate handling of information and employed objectivity in the application of the data collection methods to arrive at the desired results.

**Results**

The results on the source of the weakness of institutions show that the majority ...93.7% believed that the weaknesses of the institutions in South Sudan are a result of history, only a few.at 6.3% indicated that the weakness of the institutions in South Sudan are not a result of history. The results indicate that more people think that the problem of weakness of the institutions in South Sudan are a result of history. (See figure 1).


**Figure 1: showing the source of the weakness of the institutions in South Sudan**



**Source:** Primary Data, 2022

The results on whether the institutions in South Sudan were built on ethnic and tribal lines indicates that the majority of 60.1% disagreed that the institutions in South Sudan were built on ethnic and tribal lines, while a minority 30.3% strongly agreed. Another 3% agree, and 6.6% disagreed. The results reveal that the institutions in South Sudan were not built on ethnic and tribal lines and this may imply that ethnicity or tribal aspects overshadowed the institutions because they were just weak and could not reflect the ethnic diversity in South Sudan. (See Table 2)

**Table 2: Showing opinions on whether institutions in South Sudan were built on ethnic and tribal lines.**




**Source:** Primary Data, 2022.



The results on whether the institutions in South Sudan guarantee state security and citizen security show that the majority 60.6% strongly disagreed, while a minority 2.6% strongly agreed, a few 20.2% agreed, and 16.6% disagreed. The results reveal that the institutions in South Sudan do not guarantee security to citizens and the state (See Table 3 Below).


**Table 3: Showing whether the institutions in South Sudan guarantee security to citizens and the state**



**Source:** Primary Data, 2022

The results on whether external influence has affected the building of state institutions in South Sudan showed that the majority 93.7% agreed that actually foreign governments had in one way or the other influenced the building of state institutions in South Sudan while the minority 6.3% did not agree. The revelation from the Table above indicates that foreign governments indeed affected the construction of state institutions in South Sudan which implies there are certain instances where other states can influence institutional building and this also happened in South Sudan (See Table 4 below)


**Table 4: showing whether foreign influence has affected the building of state institutions in South Sudan**



**Source:** Primary Data, 2022.

The results on the factors that are considered to be responsible for the weak institutions in South Sudan showed that 24% of the respondents mentioned ethnic divisions, 21.4% indicated that it was corruption, armed conflict 12.2%, capacity problems, 12.6% nepotism 12.5%, leadership, 5.6%, foreign influence 4.8% and foreign education 3.6% and others at 3.3%. The results reveal that many of these factors are connected to the history of the interrupted state formation in Sudan where South Sudan was a part. (See Table 5).

**Table 5: showing the factors responsible for the weak institutions in South Sudan**



Source: Primary data, 2022

## Discussion

### History the source of weakness of Institutions in South Sudan.

The present nature and character of Institutions in South Sudan cannot be traced without analyzing the Anglo-Egyptian condominium which existed between 1898 to 1955 (Barltrop, 2015). This condominium which dominated Sudan under which Southern Sudan did not only practice bureaucratic layout which was meant to extract resources from Sudan but also operated a separate structure of administration between the north and South of Sudan (Kon, 2015). It is interesting that immediately after independence, Sudan fell into prolonged civil wars (Zapata, 2011). This can be explained in two ways, one, that what the condominium did was so ruthless that there was no space for any uprising under this exploitative rule of the British and the Egyptians. Secondly, one can say that the south was only waiting for an opportune moment to show how they had been exploited but could not garner enough military muscle to fight the condominium. This seems to suggest that the British had forced two regions into a polity which was so artificial and did not take the trouble to build institutions to deal with the challenges which were to explode because they knew their stay was temporary for economic benefits. It is important to note that the conflict that raged in Sudan (Elnur, 2009). when the people of the South were fighting for their recognition as citizens (El-Sadany, 2012) meant that the social fabric as the foundation of institutions in Sudan was shaky because the interruption of the evolutionary state foundation led to deeper divisions among the people of Sudan such that when the comprehensive Peace agreement was signed in 2005 (Aalen, 2013), not much was still together as the prolonged conflict had eroded what was left by the condominium and not much could be harnessed in the South of Sudan. The granting of the semi-autonomous government to Southern Sudan with a new interim constitution could (Medani, 2011) have laid the ground for the institutions that were to crop up and nurtured in the values, norms and traditions of Southern Sudanese but the history of the people had taken its toll on this process. This meant that the process of constructing institutions on the foundation of national identity which was missing in Sudan now stood on the fragile and persisting competing social and cultural disharmony, high illiteracy among the people of Southern Sudan and the absence of a stock of political leaders (Kon, 2015; Pape et al., 2018) who could read and understand the history of Sudan in relation to the new state that was declared in 2011.

### On whether institutions in South Sudan were built on ethnic and tribal lines.

South Sudan, like many other states in Africa particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, has national security issues and this has been reflected in the description it has continually received as a failed state,

riddled with corruption (The sentry,2019), ethnic tensions a divided army along ethnic lines and a constitution which has been argued as one which did not reflect the aspirations of the South Sudanese (Kuol, 2020). When one recalls how the British and Egyptians constructed the colonial state in Sudan, it is no wonder that the features of democracy were nowhere. This meant that participation in Sudan was not known (Deng, 2017), if it were to be there, how could the people of the north who enslaved the people of the South be involved in the process of writing a constitution.

It is from such instances that the constitution which is the guiding law on institution has been a disappointment to the people of South Sudan. Many constitutions in African states are written in foreign language and not many people are worried about this problem (Namyalo, S., & Nakayiza, 2015; Chimhundu, 1997). This could be used to explain the crimes that are experienced in these states since the citizens cannot understand and access the copies in the languages they understand. It is not surprising that in such situations national security is compromised since the relationship between different groups of people is not understood, the obligations of citizens not comprehended, protection and services to be provided and by what institutions are also not understood.

In the urge to comprehend the trials facing Africa and specifically South Sudan, while it tries to profit from continuous development and guaranteeing national security, there is necessity to put under consideration not only the institutions but effort should also be made in trying to understand what these institutions do to the practice of power. Unofficial institutions have their foundation in society instead of the state and produce a specific vibrancy to politics that cannot easily be evident where official institutions are domineering (Hyden, 2010). It is because of this reason that any inquiry around African politics is inadequate if it is observed as neutral on economy and society. It is rational to create such a difference everywhere official rulebooks exist (Hyden, 2010). What happens in most cases is that when some authors from the west are carrying out studies, little attention is done on what actually happens in Africa or it is just ignored for unknown reasons. An example is about economic institutions in Europe and Africa compared is that power in the most developed states is found basically in corporate and bureaucratic bodies (Austin, 2010).

It is very hard for one to think that the people of South Sudan could build institutions that were strong in the few years of independence (Kimenyi, 2012)., and even if they had a strong leadership of Garang, because some people see the current leadership as weak, it would be very hard to put up strong institutions. May be what happened in 2013 would have happened later but having strong institutions in a short time was a dream, the army for instance was made up of many ethnic groups (Koos, & Gutschke, 2014) and we were all fighting a common enemy (Sudan) that marginalized, discriminated and alienated them from everything. The new state of South Sudan could not have strong institutions and capacity because they did not have the background for that since the governments in Sudan could not give them a chance to have a formidable army which could fight the marginalization (BRIEF.). This is the reasons why militias were common like the white army which is known for its notoriety. It is also disturbing that instead of looking at the problems created by the colonialists, the blame is put on the ethnic groups and tribes when it comes to the institutions in these states. This kind of feeling is not different from what some authors like Omoleye, A. Ufiwma & Segun Joshua, 2018) who have argued that the conflicts in states like South Sudan can, to a degree be discovered in the dangers caused by tearing states alone by the colonialists thereby splitting ethnicities into distinct or conflicting states and creating states which have majority and minority ethnic groups which are now becoming blame groups. It is also important to argue that the minority groups that are often left out of economic and political and social participation and development will often look up to themselves to try to make themselves recognizable through armed conflict. Therefore, it becomes questionable when one starts thinking that ethnicity and tribes are the blocks for institutions but these ethnicities are important fallback positions when the security of the members of these ethnic groups is threatened. It is therefore important to recognize the

importance of values, norms beliefs and principles in given societies to institution building and once these are destroyed the ethnic groups will become the fallback position to guarantee the security of the people who are often relegated and neglected as it was the case with the people of Southern Sudan before they seceded from Sudan. In his works Alonso José Antonio, argued that societies are directed by their culture and do whatever they do given the norms and values of their cultures (Alonso, 2012). It is critical to notice the laws that progress in any particular society originate from the culture of a given people and these laws are made to enhance the unity of people. It is from such processes that national integration and institutions are constructed which conclusively assure national security as citizens look at themselves as members with the same values. It is no wonder that Rajapaksa, (2011). defined the idea of security, as the protection of norms, values, and institutions of the society. He further argues for the protection of these from military and non-military threats like those of the colonialists which compromised the norms and values of the indigenous people in Sudan and the effect is felt in the national insecurity.

### **Foreign interference**

Getting hold of territory consequently demands the creation of governmental culpabilities and these comprise police or security of the territory and the inhabitants in the polity conquered by the conquerors. The existence of the essentials from the conqueror's part and the need from the side of the defeated in the polity creates an environment of shared acceptance between the two sides. What is not stated at this moment is the situation where the conqueror is not interested in the area but only interested in what the vanquished have as was the case with the colonialists in Sudan and in so many places in Africa. If an individual does not assess this kind of situation, makes it hard for one to see how the foreign leaders influenced the creation of State institutions. Here, one can appreciate why the colonialists could not construct institutions that would fight them. In such circumstances, they put more importance on divide and rule which intensified or sharpened ethnic divisions that were there in the process of state formation before the coming of the colonialists (Tharoor, 2017). Unquestionably, the institutions that were passed on to the new leaders at independence were a reflection of the foundation that was built by the colonialists. Cheeseman, & Fisher, (2019) while writing about how colonial rule bound Africa to fragile authoritarianism" showed the troubles of colonialism in the institutional set up of what was bequeathed to the leaders who came after them. One wonders really if the situation in Sudan and South Sudan that broke away from Sudan could be different from a pattern which is hypothesized to be the same in areas where colonialism was practiced most especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to observe that Africa had its type of governance culture in the period before the coming of the colonialists, which, during this contact with the outside world was destroyed by the effects of slavery, colonialism and the new wave of the latest form of colonialism (Farah, Kiamba, and Kesegofetse, 2011). While debating the same (Wyk, 2007) attractively observed that the modern African State is a leftover of a past colonial state with a system and institutions forced on the Africans. In the confusion that was created by the colonial interruption of the process of state formation the African leaders picked on a colonial-built system which led to tribal and cultural divisions and totalitarian grounded values (ibid). It is not by coincidence that the colonial powers were not attracted to building democratic institutions in Africa nor were they ready to train the new African leaders in what they deemed important for the type of Westphalian state they had in Europe. On the other hand, they used the Africans for their own interests and the post-independence era became a period of trying to forge national integration (Lancaster, 2012) which is very vital for national security. According to Copson, (2001), the colonial polity in Africa was characterized by totalitarianism and it was an inflexible device of domination and was never an institution of democracy as planned by the colonialists.

A constitution is a central institution or the supreme law of the land which guides and directs all the activities in a given state stipulating the functions of the rest of the institution. This constitution

mirrors the social contract or agreement between the citizens and the state in regards to the protection of the citizens and the contribution of the citizens to the state for the protection from the army in a polity. This is well brought about by (Alonso José Antonio Alonso, 2012). who argued that political communities begin as social communities and then make over into States and that communities are guided by their culture and do whatever they do given the norms and values of their cultures (ibid). It is from these values, norms and customs that are transformed into laws which are written in constitutions. This does not dispute what Kofi, (2016). argued when he asserted that the constitutions that are made in African States like that of South Sudan are aware of and endorse or encourage the traditions and customary habits and systems. However, these constitutions are made in foreign languages and the constitution making process is influenced by the international actors (Seidel & Sureau, 2015) like it is the case in South Sudan. It is not surprising that the introduction of English in southern Sudan cannot be easily separated from the English used in the constitution making process. This reflects the influence of Britain in Southern Sudan and its interruption of state formation in Sudan which laid the ground for the weak institutions in the new state. This implies that constitutions that are made are not a true reflection of the norms, custom, values and the traditions of people in South Sudan. In these circumstances, the constitutions that are made in a foreign language depict a misnomer like it has been in many African countries where so many people cannot read and understand their own constitutions. This can partly explain why people in such States are not connected and aligned to the values of their countries. This lays ground for the threats that often make the states fail to protect people and the state thereby undermining the national security of the state of South Sudan.

### **Factors responsible for the weak institutions in South Sudan**

If one looked at South Sudan from the state formation perspective it would not be surprising that southern Sudan which later became the state of South Sudan is threatened by ethnic hegemony and armed conflict not only seen from what was happening after South Sudan got independence but also from the historical trends which were very clear from what the colonialists had sowed in terms of ethnic difference and therefore making the constitution was going to be tricky because of ethnic differences and also by how the colonialists had put a wedge between the people in Sudan where South Sudan was part. This resonates with what (Willis, 2005) argued when he observed that the fact that southern Sudan was created by Anglo- Egyptians colonialists from unequal and dissimilar collection of tribes its integration and collectivizing ability after seceding became a future challenge. The fact that the leaders in South Sudan were not well groomed in serving the people as it was in Sudan (Lin, 2018; Teny-Dhurgon,1995) is one line of thinking which may explain why they are not dealing with the issue of constitution writing seriously in South Sudan. If the question is answered by experience, then again one would say that their stay in Sudan did not help them much in terms of education and experience even when the regional self-government could have provided the background (Bredlid,2014). Therefore, one can say that the state formation process that was interrupted in Sudan laid the ground for the poor process in the constitution process since there were no values and ideas that would make the people come together in the constitution making process which would legitimize the state and citizen relation in South Sudan. The constitution making process that would galvanize the social contract theory therefore seemed a fraud process which threatens the national security of the state and citizens. There have been growing fears over ethnic problems in the institutions in South Sudan and this seems to be the topic which could not disappear from the media in South Sudan as complaints and instances of marginalization and discrimination continued to fill spaces of print media over what was going to happen to the new nation which had more than sixty 60 ethnic groups (Gebremichael, Kifle, & Kidane, 2018). but at least only about four or three ethnic groups are visible in the institutions in South Sudan (Omoleye, & Joshua, 2018; Jok, 2011). This indicates that the other smaller ethnic groups in South Sudan were left out of the participation in their government as citizens. When some



groups feel they are not receiving what they are supposed to get it is often possible that they will fight for their rights, economic, social, and political as it was in Sudan. It is therefore important to argue that the state formation process which was interrupted prepared the circumstances where ethnic division was a value in areas where colonialists did not want ethnic harmony in colonized areas like Sudan where South Sudan was a part. It is important to express the fact that the divisions that were encouraged by the colonialists (Chuei, 2009). did not spare any institution including the army as it is seen by what happened in South Sudan. This, in effect meant that it was unlikely for different ethnic groups that were made to fight one another to develop cross ethnic coalitions that would prevent the development of horizontal inequalities which could contribute to violence (DiJohn,2008). This is peculiar in other states which did not face colonialism except in Africa where the threats from within can easily become threats from outside where insurgents can easily get support from across the border.

The corruption and rot in South Sudan institutions resonates with what Alex de Waal (2016). argued when he was commenting on the situation and the conflict which broke out in South Sudan and divided the country. He argued that the “big tent” policy which in the real sense meant the use of state money to buy off loyalty by licensing corruption, necessitated having huge amounts of money which could not be accessed in the state by that time. This coupled with the political competition in the ruling party deepened not only between the two top most leaders but even with those in the lower ranks of the political class in the new state. It is no wonder that several reports about governance in South Sudan bring out instances of corruption among the leaders of the new state (The sentry, 2019). This follows in the steps of the trade that ensued in the aftermath of getting markets and raw materials which made Africans to be seen as goods (Slavery) in southern Sudan and the economic institutions that were built by the aliens in Africa could not maintain the values of society when state formation was interrupted and therefore the result is the weak institutions that cannot protect citizens and national security. That the army in South Sudan is divided brings out the aspect of having two or more armies in the same polity of South Sudan (Sudan Tribune (2014). This in every way exposes the fact that the state has a multiplicity of institutions which have different rules since the army under one leader could not have the same command as that under the commander in chief who is the president of the republic of South Sudan. This has weakened the not only the institution of the presidency (Mbaku, 2014; Obonyo, 2014) but also the other state institutions like the police (Abatneh, & Lubang, 2011; Lokuji, Abatneh, & Wani, 2009) and judiciary (Diehl, Arol, & Malz, 2015) and subsequently threatens the national security of the state.

This further means that the security of individuals and the state is threatened since there is no well-built institution which reflects the values and aspirations and interest of the state.

### **Institutions guarantee of citizens and state security**

The protection of values, norms and institutions in a society is supported by what Rajapaksa (2011), put forward when he argued that the meaning of security as a concept of security incorporates the preservation of values, norms and institutions of a given society. It is further argued that there is often the need to protect all the components of a culture from threats which are associated with the traditional security (Buzan, Ole, & Wilde, 1998). Therefore, once the colonial powers interfered with the foundations of the African peoples’ culture, the core of the social institutions was broken. The effect of this was the destruction of the economic and political institutions since societies build from the social, economic and to political which are meant to protect the citizens and the state. The problem has been and is also present in South Sudan where even the army was divided along ethnic lines. This state of affairs compromised the protection of civilians and state borders. The massacres in Malakal as a result of ethnic tensions among the Nuer, Dinka and the Shilluk (Center for Civilians in Conflict 2016) is an example of the failure of state institutions where the United Nations was called in to establish Protection of civilian sites which were also attacked by soldiers

(Giffen, Gorur, Jok, & Mayai, 2014). This demonstrates how institutions built on ethnic lines cannot protect human and national security. The economic institutions in South Sudan that are thought to get power from the society have ended up being weak either because of nepotism, tribalism and corruption. Where such evils do not crop up, patronage evolves when the leaders use other people to do business on their behalf and then taxes are not paid and the leaders and the compromised conduits of wealth end up becoming weak. In such instances no strong economic institutions can be built for national security. This is the kind of situation which befell not only South Sudan but Africa where power is built on personal levels rather than institutions, therefore the state functions in a much more unstable and problematic setting than in states where power has been built to be official. It has been easy to trace this to the colonial state in Sudan which did not build any institution for accountability, transparency or good governance since the colonial state was not interested in that (Zambakari, 2017). This was the foundation on which South Sudan as a state was built.

Subsequently, the governments and the people responsible cannot do an easy work to make society comprehensible for specific action plans. The operation expenses connected to the execution of action plans consequently are quite distinct (Boone, 2003). The end result of all this is having weak institutions which cannot support the army for the traditional security of protecting the borders and also having values which are built to conserve the survival of the state (Attinà, 2016). This is made worse when some ethnic groups are divided up by artificial borders which were drawn by the colonial powers. South Sudan has tribes that were divided up across borders (Gashaw, 2017) in northern Uganda, in western Ethiopia in the Gambella region (Wubneh, 2015). Those that have stolen can easily run to their kinsmen and possibly wage wars and cause insecurity (Ikome, 2012). against states that are trying to make them face justice. This has often led to failure of the justice system to dispense justice. Indeed, institutions in South Sudan were not well constructed or had issues which made them become weak and therefore could not function well to protect the new State and the citizens in the state. This, according to some authors was common in many African states whose state formation process was interrupted by colonialists who built institutions that were to serve their colonial government interests and their agents (Austin, 2010; Ocheni, & Nwankwo, 2012). It can be revealed that the mechanisms that were used by the colonial state in all the areas where they interrupted the state formation process, the colonialists made sure that the institutions that were built were either constructed on divide and rule (Deng, 1997; Bethke, 2011), violence and targeted development which made them get the raw materials or resources and tools that could benefit them but not the indigenous people who could become powerful and fight the colonialists. The foundation therefore, on which these institutions were built were foreign and could not in any way be useful to those who got them after independence and were uniquely built (Bolt, & Gardner, 2020). with the expertise of the colonialists and their agents and they could not be useful in protecting the citizens.

## **Conclusion**

This paper examined the impact of the disrupted state formation process on institutions building, their nature and character in South Sudan from the time when the southern part of Sudan had been given partial autonomy from Sudan. South Sudan has been listed as one of the states that are categorized as failed states. A good number of authors have not considered the history of South Sudan when examining institutions in South Sudan. The colonial state in Sudan has had far reaching impact not only on Sudan but also in South Sudan. The area which was covered by Sudan before the secession of Southern Sudan to form the state of South Sudan had polities but many who study state formation in Africa prefer to examine the African state from the colonial times as if there was no nation, or emerging states in the same area. This has led to the partial explanation of the impact of colonialism on the institutions built in many states in Africa including South Sudan which was shaped under Sudan. The colonialists did not in any way try to build institutions which would

protect the citizens and states in post-colonial times. The colonialists built brutal forces, agents who served their interests, they used divide and rule, the economic infrastructure that were built were not meant to advantage the indigenous people. There was no form of democracy, they introduced their languages, education system and the administration structure built on dominance of some tribes over others. The remains of such institutions was what was given to leaders at independence. In Sudan, there was no chance that southern Sudan would be any better as it was enslaved and denied any foundation of institutions. This explains the secession of the South, but the new state of South Sudan could not escape the colonial history of institutions in Sudan where it was a part. The institutions that were built could not guarantee the national security of the new state of South Sudan.

## References

1. Alesina, A., & Giuliano, P. (2015). Culture and institutions. *Journal of economic literature*, 53(4), 898-944.
2. Scholvin, S. (2011). The Failure Of Nation-Building In Iraq. *World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues*, 15(3), 48–70. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504828> Accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2022
3. Bayeh, E. (2015). The political and economic legacy of colonialism in the post-independence African states. *International Journal in Commerce, IT & Social Sciences*, 2(2), 90
4. Farah, Ibrahim, Kiamba, Sylvia and Mazongo, Kesegofetse (2011) “Major challenges facing Africa in the 21st century: A few provocative remarks At the International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy in Africa - Strategies to confront the Challenges of the 21st Century: Does Africa have what is required?”, International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy in Africa 14th – 17th July, Berlin.
5. Lancaster, Andy. (2012) The Divisive nature of Ethnicity in Ugandan Politics, Before and After Independence. E-International Relations <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/25/the-divisive-nature-of-ethnicity-in-ugandan-politics-before-and-after-independence/> Accessed 24th June 2022
6. Copson, R. W. (2001). *Africa Background: History, U.S. Policy, Principal Congressional Actions*. Washington: CRS Report for Congress
7. Ali, M., Fjeldstad, O. H., & Shifa, A. B. (2020). European colonization and the corruption of local elites: The case of chiefs in Africa. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 179, 80-100.
8. Gabriel, R. Some Social and Economic Aspects of Turco-Egyptian Rule in the Sudan. *BELLETTEN*, 53(207-208), 769-796.
9. Moore, M. (2004). Revenues, state formation, and the quality of governance in developing countries. *International Political Science Review*, 25(3), 297-319.
10. Yakubu, Y. Effects of Colonialism on State Fragility in Africa.
11. Bellucci, B. (2010). O Estado na África. *Revista tempo do mundo*, 2(3), 9-43.
12. Austin, G. (2010). *African economic development and colonial legacies* (No. 1, pp. 11-32). Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement.
13. The British conquest - Sudan - Encyclopedia Britannica; <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sudan/The-British-conquest> Accessed 29<sup>th</sup> June 2022
14. Bertocchi, G., & Canova, F. (2002). Did colonization matter for growth?: An empirical exploration into the historical causes of Africa's underdevelopment. *European economic review*, 46(10), 1851-1871.

15. Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. *American economic review*, 91(5), 1369-1401.
16. Sokoloff, K. L., & Engerman, S. L. (2000). Institutions, factor endowments, and paths of development in the new world. *Journal of Economic perspectives*, 14(3), 217-232.
17. Engerman, S. L., & Sokoloff, K. L. (2002). Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among new world economics.
18. Farnetti, P. B., & Novelli, C. D. (Eds.). (2015). *Colonialism and national identity*. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
19. DiJohn, J. (2008). *Conceptualising the causes and consequences of failed states: a critical review of the literature*. London: Crisis States Research Centre.
20. Yurtseven, G. State Failure or State Formation? Neopatrimonialism and Its Limitations in Africa.
21. Lambach, D., Johais, E., & Bayer, M. (2017). Conceptualising state collapse: an institutionalist approach. *Fragility, Aid, and State-building*, 31.
22. Carneiro, R. (1970). A theory of the Origin of the State. *Science*.
23. Hall, R. E., & Jones, C. I. (1999). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others?. *The quarterly journal of economics*, 114(1), 83-116.
24. Carroll Paul. (2009). *Journal of Historical Sociology*. Oxford UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
25. Pemberton, J. C. (2014). Defence of the Realm: Conscription and Social Contract Theory. In *The Australian Political Studies Association Annual Conference, University of Sydney Paper*.
26. Salihu, N. (2016). The colonial legacy of civil-military relations and democratic stability in West Africa. *Conflict Trends*, 2016(4), 50-56.
27. Charlotte Ng. (2008). *How Does the Process of State Formation in Most Developing Countries Differ from the Process Experienced in Europe and with what Consequences for their Developmental Potential?* London: E-International Relations.
28. Fischer-Tiné, H., & Gehrman, S. (2009). *Empires and Boundaries: Rethinking Race, Class, and Gender in Colonial Settings*. Routledge.
29. Tharoor, S. (2017, August 10). The Partition: The British game of 'divide and rule'. *The Partition: The British game of 'divide and rule'*.
30. Cheeseman, N., & Fisher, J. (2019). Repression, Resistance, and the Power of Ideas. In A. Africa, *Nic Cheeseman; Jonathan Fisher*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
31. Elnur, I. (2009). *Contested Sudan: The political economy of war and reconstruction*. Routledge.
32. El-Sadany, M. (2012). Sudan: From Conflict To Conflict. *Middle East*.
33. Aalen, L. (2013). Making unity unattractive: The conflicting aims of Sudan's comprehensive peace agreement. *Civil Wars*, 15(2), 173-191.
34. Medani, K. M. (2011). Strife and secession in Sudan. *Journal of Democracy*, 22(3), 135-149.
35. Kon, M. (2015). Institutional development, governance, and ethnic politics in South Sudan. *Journal of Global Economics*.
36. Pape, U. J., Parisotto, L., Phipps-Ebeler, V., Mueller, A. J. M., Ralston, L. R., Nezam, T., &

37. The sentry (2019) The Taking of South Sudan; The Tycoons, Brokers, and Multinational Corporations Complicit in Hijacking the World's Newest State September. The Sentry. Available at <https://cdn.thesentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/TakingOfSouthSudan-Sept2019-TheSentry.pdf> Accessed on 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2022
38. Kuol, L. B. D. (2020). South Sudan: the elusive quest for a resilient social contract? *Journal of intervention and state-building*, 14(1), 64-83.
39. Barltrop, R. (2015). Lessons from the past? Approaches to conflict and peace in Sudan, 1899-1955.
40. Zapata, M. (2011). Sudan: Independence through Civil Wars, 1956-2005. *The Enough Project*, 13.
41. Deng, M. A. (2017). Defining the nature and limits of presidential powers in the transitional Constitution of South Sudan: a politically contentious matter for the new nation. *Journal of African Law*, 61(1), 23-39.
42. Namyalo, S., & Nakayiza, J. (2015). Dilemmas in implementing language rights in multilingual Uganda. *Current Issues in Language Planning*, 16(4), 409-424.
43. Chimhundu, H. (1997). Language policies in Africa. *Report*.
44. Hyden, G. (2010). *Political Accountability in Africa: Is the Glass Half-full or Half-empty?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
45. Zambakari, C. (2012). South Sudan: institutional legacy of colonialism and the making of a new state. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 17(3), 515-532.
46. Shankleman, J. (2011). *Oil and State Building in South Sudan*. US Institute of Peace.
47. Fallet, M. G. (2010). *The impact of the oil industry on local communities in South Sudan* (Master's thesis).
48. Samuel, I. A., Akeem, O. A., & Esther, A. A. (2019). Ethnicity, inequality and the tragedy of African development: a comparative case study of Nigeria and the South Sudan. *Journal of Globalization Studies*, 10(1), 111-129.
49. Weichlein, S. (2007). Structuring the state. The formation of Italy and Germany and the puzzle of Federalism.
50. Buzan, B., Ole, W., Waeber, O., & Wilde, J. d. (1998). *Security: A new Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
51. Center for Civilians in Conflict. (2016). A Refuge in Flames: The February 17–18 Violence in Malakal POC.
52. Giffen, A., Gorur, A., Jok, J. M., & Mayai, A. T. (2014). Will They Protect Us for the Next 10 Years?. *Challenges Faced by the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan*.
53. Zambakari, C. (2017). Land grab and institutional legacy of colonialism: The case of Sudan. *Consilience*, (18), 193-204.
54. Boone, C. (2003). *Political topographies of the African state: Territorial authority and institutional choice*. Cambridge University Press.
55. Attinà, F. (2016). Traditional security issues. In *China, the European Union, and the international politics of global governance* (pp. 175-193). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.



56. Gashaw, T. (2017). Colonial Borders in Africa: Improper Design and its Impact on African Borderland Communities. *Africa up Close*, 17.
57. Wubneh, M. (2015). This land is my land: the Ethio-Sudan boundary and the need to rectify arbitrary colonial boundaries. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 33(4), 441-466.
58. Ikome, F. N. (2012). Africa's international borders as potential sources of conflict and future threats to peace and security. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, 2012(233), 16.
59. Ocheni, S., & Nwankwo, B. C. (2012). Analysis of colonialism and its impact in Africa. *Cross-Cultural Communication*, 8(3), 46-54.
60. Deng, F. M. (1997). Ethnicity: An African predicament. *The Brookings Review*, 15(3), 28-31.
61. Bethke, F. S. (2011). The consequences of 'divide-and-rule' politics in Africa. In *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association* (pp. 1-25).
62. Bolt, J., & Gardner, L. (2020). How Africans Shaped British Colonial Institutions: Evidence from Local Taxation. *The Journal of Economic History*, 80(4), 1189-1223. doi:10.1017/S0022050720000455
63. Wa Muiu, M. (2010). Colonial and postcolonial state and development in Africa. *Social research: an international quarterly*, 77(4), 1311-1338.
64. Johnson, D. H. (2012). British Policy in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Bears Some Responsibility for the Deep-Rooted Divisions between North and South. *Africa at LSE*, 2.
65. Lin, D. (2018). The Role of British Colonial Policy in the South Sudanese Civil War: A Postcolonial Conflict Analysis.
66. Mbaku, J. M., Smith, J. E., & Watkins, K. (2012). One Year After South Sudan's Independence: Opportunities and Obstacles for Africa's Newest Country.
67. Chevillon-Guibert, R. (2013). State Building in South Sudan: A Sociology of the New Administrative Elites. *Afrique contemporaine*, (2), 53-80.
68. Darwisheh, H. Egyptian-Sudanese relations amidst power struggles in the Middle East and Horn of Africa.
69. Young, J. (2019). *South Sudan's Civil War: Violence, Insurgency and Failed Peacemaking*. Bloomsbury Publishing.
70. Copson, Raymond W. (2001) "Africa Background: History, U.S. Policy, Principal Congressional Actions." CRS Report for Congress
71. Omoleye, A. U., & Joshua, S. (2018). The South Sudan War: Causes and Implications for National Integration. *AKSU Journal OJ Social And Management Sciences*, 1(8), 79-96.
72. Nabudere, D. W. (1981). Imperialism and the Struggle for New Democracy Under Proletarian Leadership. *Ikhwezi* Number 18.
73. BRIEF, H. P. Negotiating Peace in South Sudan: Analyzing Crucial Aspects of the August.
74. Kuol, K. D. (2018). 'Confronting the challenges of South Sudan's security sector: a practitioner's perspective.''. *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, 29.
75. Omoleye, A. U., & Joshua, S. (2018). The South Sudan War: Causes and Implications for National Integration. *AKSU fournal OJ Social And Management Sciences*, 1(8), 79-96.
76. Alonso, J. A. (2012). *From aid to global development policy*. New York: United Nations-Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

77. De Waal, A., & Ndula, V. (2016). South Sudan: the price of war, the price of peace. *Justice and Security Research Programme Blog*.
78. Kitler, W. (2011). *National security of the Republic of Poland. Basic categories, conditions, system*. Warszawa: Basic categories, conditions, system.
79. Rajapaksa, M. (2011). Sri Lanka Statement. *General Debate of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (p. 6). New York: Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the United Nations.
80. Wyk, J.-A. V. (2007). *Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers*. Durban, South Africa: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.